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A B S T R A C T
This paper studies the international spillovers of US monetary policy shocks on a number of macroeconomic
and financial variables in 36 advanced and emerging economies. In most countries, a surprise US monetary
tightening leads to depreciation against the dollar; industrial production and real GDP fall, unemployment
rises. Inflation declines especially in advanced economies. At the same time, there is significant heterogene-
ity across countries in the response of asset prices, and portfolio and banking cross-border flows. However,
no clear-cut systematic relation emerges between country responses and likely relevant country character-
istics, such as their income level, dollar exchange rate flexibility, financial openness, trade openness vs. the
US, dollar exposure in foreign assets and liabilities, and incidence of commodity exports.
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
This paper offers a re-examination of the international repercus-
sions of U.S. monetary policy shocks. Does a monetary contraction
in the U.S. lead to recessions or expansions in other countries?
Does a monetary contraction improve or worsen financial conditions
abroad? Does it lead to capital inflows or outflows? Are spillovers
different across advanced and emerging economies, or across coun-
tries pegging their exchange rate to the dollar and those retaining
monetary autonomy? These questions have long been studied and
discussed, but empirical answers remain controversial, as recently
argued by the former chairman of the Federal Reserve (Bernanke,
2015). A source of this lack of consensus is that most studies have
tended to focus either on a limited set of countries (e.g., G7 coun-
tries, as in Kim, 2001) or on a limited set of variables (mainly output,
inflation, short-term rates and bilateral dollar exchange rates as in
e.g., Miniane and Rogers, 2007). In turn, the heterogeneity in the
scope of these studies has made comparability of spillovers from
their different estimates not very straightforward.
In this paper we contribute to this debate by documenting the
effects of US monetary policy shocks on a broad set of macroeconomic
and financial variables in 18 advanced and 18 emerging economies.
We expand on previous work mainly in two dimensions. First, we
* Corresponding author.
identify US monetary policy shocks assuming that they have empir-
ically plausible effects consistent with “textbook” monetary theory,
also modelling their impact on a range of interest rates and asset
prices. Second, and most importantly, in order to better understand
the international transmission of monetary policy, we expand the set
of the variables in countries other than the US included in our analysis.
Going beyond measures of real activity and inflation, we also consider
the responses of financial variables such as equity and housing prices,
credit, and bank and portfolio flows. This allows us to better docu-
ment any trade-off in terms of macroeconomic and financial stability
for other countries brought about by a US monetary policy shock.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that a surprise
US monetary tightening leads to a depreciation vis-à-vis the dol-
lar in most countries in our sample, and drives them into recession.
In a large majority of countries industrial production and real GDP
fall, and unemployment rises; however, the trade balance improves.
Inflation (both GDP deflator and CPI) also falls in a majority of coun-
tries, although these effects are less precisely estimated. Emerging
economies tend to experience higher macroeconomic volatility. At
the same time, and this is our second finding, the responses of
financial variables are less clear cut and quite heterogeneous across
countries. While many countries see their bond yields increase rel-
ative to the US, real equity and housing prices drop in just about
half of the countries, mainly comprising emerging economies. Like-
wise, many countries experience opposite effects on domestic credit
and capital flows, including borrowing from foreign banks. Finally,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2017.01.002
0022-1996/© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
S24 L. Dedola et al. / Journal of International Economics 108 (2017) S23–S41
we do not find evidence of a systematic relation between likely rel-
evant country characteristics (such as income level, exchange rate
regime, financial openness, trade openness vs. the US, dollar expo-
sure and incidence of commodity exports) and the distribution of
cross-country responses to US monetary policy shocks.1 For instance,
across more and less financially open countries, asset prices and
capital flows do not seem to react much differently.2
We carry out our analysis in two steps. First, we estimate US
monetary policy shocks in a structural VAR identified with sign
restrictions. These restrictions are consistent both with standard
monetary theory, and with recent results in the empirical literature
on the effects of monetary shocks. We then regress third country
variables on estimated shocks. Hence, we are asking the following
question: What are the consequences on the rest of the world of a US
monetary policy shock, conditional on this shock having the assumed
effects on the US economy?3 Namely, we take for granted that mon-
etary shocks have “textbook” effects on the US economy, such as that
a tightening should reduce economic activity and inflation, while at
the same time raising a range of interest rates.4
Specifically, in our first step we impose sign restrictions broadly
consistent with the empirical findings in Gertler and Karadi (2015),
which are representative of the literature. In addition to responses
of output and inflation in line with previous evidence, these authors
also estimate the effects of monetary policy shocks on several asset
prices and interest rate spreads. This is an attractive feature for us,
given our focus on the propagation of US monetary policy to interna-
tional asset prices and interest rates. Moreover, their identification
and results are robust to the presence of the lower bound on short-
term interest rates in the aftermath of the Great Recession. By basing
our restrictions on their estimates we can thus hope to make our
results robust over the period that includes the global financial crisis.
However, to further sharpen our identification, we also require that
shocks also satisfy two further restrictions.5 First, we impose that on
impact the US effective nominal exchange rate appreciates follow-
ing a US tightening. Second, that an aggregate of short-term rates in
other major currencies react less than one-to-one to US rates. This
ensures that we focus on those US monetary policy shocks which
are not too positively correlated with any monetary policy shocks
in other major countries. This concern is especially relevant in the
aftermath of the recent financial crisis, when short-term rates in
most advanced economies have been close to their lower bound, and
more or less contemporaneously very expansionary conventional
(and unconventional) monetary policies have been deployed. We
find that under our identification assumptions, estimated impulse
responses in the VAR are indeed robust to the inclusion of the 5 years
from January 2009 to December 2013.
In our second step, armed with our estimated monetary policy
shocks, we turn to the estimation of their effects on other countries.
Similarly to other papers (e.g., Romer and Romer, 2004), we regress
a host of variables for each country both at monthly and quarterly
frequency on the estimated shocks. We then aggregate these esti-
mates across countries on the basis of several structural characteris-
tics. Namely, we compute median responses across countries in the
1 A caveat is that the spillovers from US monetary policy shocks are much less
precisely estimated if we end our sample in the half of 2008.
2 A reason why we do not find sharp differences across exchange rate regimes
(beyond a more muted response of the bilateral dollar exchange rate in countries with
lower exchange rate flexibility) could be that none of the countries in our sample has
been all the time in a dollar peg.
3 Thus a more precise title of the paper would be “If the Fed makes the US sneeze,
who catches the cold?”
4 See however Ramey (2016) for a critical appraisal of the literature on the domestic
effects of US monetary policy shocks, challenging the robustness of the consensus view
that we instead take as our starting point.
5 This is a key reason why we do not use the shocks by Gertler and Karadi (2015)
directly. See a thorough discussion in Section 2.2.
same group. We group countries on the basis of the following char-
acteristics: a) income levels — advanced and emerging economies;
b) exchange rate regime — floaters and dollar pegs according to the
de facto classification in Klein and Shambaugh (2010); c) financial
openness according to the classification in Chinn and Ito (2006); d)
US trade exposure and financial dollar exposure, the latter based on
the currency composition of gross assets and liabilities in Benetrix et
al. (2015); and e) incidence of commodity exports. Therefore, simi-
lar to Klein and Shambaugh (2010), we look at the role of receiving
countries’ structural characteristics and choice of policy regime in
influencing the degree to which US monetary policy may impose
(positive or negative) externalities abroad.6
Of course, our work is quite closely related to previous con-
tributions in the literature on the global effects of U.S. monetary
policy shocks (see Bernanke, 2015). A large body of this literature
has shown that in the post-Bretton Woods period interest rates are
more closely linked in countries that peg and in countries with open
capital markets compared with countries that do not peg or impose
capital restrictions.7 Di Giovanni and Shambaugh (2008) look at the
effect of foreign interest rates on domestic growth in a large group
of countries, finding that the effect is stronger in countries with fixed
exchange rate regimes, mainly on account of the stronger impact of
foreign interest rates on domestic interest rates. Among VAR stud-
ies which try to control for systematic components in US interest
rates, Canova (2005) and Mackowiak (2007) identify the effects of
US monetary policy shocks on selected emerging economies. The
former focuses on Latin American countries, finding that floaters
and pegs display similar output but different inflation and interest
rate responses. The latter finds that the impact on output and the
price level in a few emerging economies are actually larger than in
the US. Miniane and Rogers (2007), identifying US monetary shocks
with contemporaneous exclusion restrictions, find no evidence that
capital controls are effective in insulating other countries. Also in
line with our results, they find that the exchange rate regime does
not matter much for the macroeconomic transmission of US shocks,
with countries having a fixed exchange rate regime being simi-
larly affected as floaters in terms of output and inflation. Georgiadis
(2016) shows, among other findings, that a floating exchange rate
reduces the output spillover from US monetary policy shocks (the
more so, the more trade and financially open the receiving coun-
tries). Most of these contributions do not consider, however, the
potential financial dimension of spillovers, as we do in this paper.
Similarly to us, Banerjee et al. (2016) document that a US con-
tractionary monetary policy shock leads to a retrenchment in EME
capital flows, a fall in EME GDP, and an exchange rate depreciation. In
a theoretical model built to account for these findings, they show that
macroeconomic spillovers may be exacerbated by financial frictions.
Recently, Rey (2013) has shown that capital flows and stock prices
in most countries, regardless of their exchange rate regime against
the dollar, display strong comovements with the global cycle. The
latter in turn is affected by US monetary policy. Miranda-Agrippino
and Rey (2015) provide further evidence along the same lines, also
using a large Bayesian VAR. Hence, monetary autonomy from the US
is either not granted by a float or not sufficiently used. In this view,
6 We assign a country to a given group over the whole sample. However, to the
extent that some country characteristics have not been very stable in our sample,
this approach can bias our results toward finding less stark differences across country
groups. Moreover, characteristics like the exchange rate regime or the degree of finan-
cial openness may be endogenously chosen to some extent as a function of the effects
of US monetary policy shocks.
7 See e.g., Klein and Shambaugh (2010). However, Rose (2011) finds that the
macroeconomic and financial consequences of exchange rate regime choices are sur-
prisingly inconsequential. Business cycles, capital flows, and other phenomena for
peggers have been similar to those for inflation targeters during the global financial
crisis and its aftermath.
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the real choice confronting many countries is therefore a dilemma
between monetary policy autonomy and unfettered capital mobility,
rather than the classic Mundellian trilemma.8
The paper is organized as follows. We describe the empirical
approach in Section 2, and present our data in Section 3. The US BVAR
results are in Section 4; baseline results for all countries and for the
subgroups are in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. Empirical approach
We proceed in two steps. First, we estimate US monetary pol-
icy shocks using a large Bayesian VAR including several monthly US
and global variables. We identify these shocks by imposing “text-
book” sign restrictions on the effects of monetary policy shocks,
drawing from the findings in the structural VAR literature. Second,
following the literature (e.g., Romer and Romer, 2004), we obtain
impulse responses by estimating simple autoregressive models for
each variable in each country, including also contemporaneous and
lagged values of the shocks. We then aggregate the resulting impulse
responses across countries according to their own characteristics. A
way to view our approach is the following. Conditional on assum-
ing that there are US monetary policy shocks that have empirically
plausible domestic effects consistent with standard theory, our aim
is to investigate the consequences of these shocks for the rest of the
world. Thus, we take for granted that these shocks have domestic
effects on the US economy, such as that an interest rate hike (cut)
should reduce (boost) economic activity and asset prices, and (at
some point) also inflation. We rely on representative results in the
literature to spell these effects out in an empirically plausible way
with our priors, in particular Gertler and Karadi (2015) — hence-
forth GK, so that we can obtain estimates of the underlying monetary
policy shocks.
2.1. The BVAR model
The empirical model used to estimate US monetary policy shocks
is a Large BVAR. This tool has been introduced by Bańbura et al.
(2010) to avoid the issue of over-fitting when dealing with systems of
many variables, building on the seminal contributions by Litterman
(1986) and Sims and Zha (1998). The rationale behind this approach
is that by using informative priors it is possible to shrink the likely
over-parametrized VAR toward a more parsimonious model. There-
fore, the choice of the informativeness of the priors is crucial. In
this work we follow the approach of Giannone et al. (2015); i.e.,
the appropriate degree of shrinkage is selected by treating hyper-
parameters as any other unknown parameter, formulating a prior
over them and using the data to determine their posterior values.
Specifically, the reduced form VAR model for n variables,
Yt = BYt−1 + et , et ∼ N (0,S)
is conceived as a hierarchical model, where hyper-parameters are
assigned diffuse hyper-priors so that maximizing their posterior sim-
ply amounts to maximizing the marginal likelihood with respect to
8 Ostry and Ghosh (2016) point out that there may be a need for policy coordination
if US monetary policy creates trade-offs for the receiving countries that they cannot
(costlessly) undo with their own macroeconomic policy. Nevertheless, Woodford
(2007) shows that globalisation does not, in general, imply a loss of monetary
control in a model with frictionless international asset markets. Fahri and Werning
(2014) provide an elegant model of such a dilemma.
them. As regards priors, a Normal — Inverse-Wishart distribution is
used for the coefficients and the variance–covariance matrix, namely
S ∼ IW (xIn; n + 2)
vec(B) | S ∼ N (b,S ⊗ Y)
where b(c) and Y(c) are functions of a small vector of hyper-
parameters c. The scale parameter x is also a hyper-parameter,
which follows a diffuse prior, x ∼ IG(0.022, 0.022). Bayesian shrink-
age is achieved through the combination of Minnesota, sum-of-
coefficients and dummy-initial-observation priors for the VAR coef-
ficients. The Minnesota prior assumes that the limiting form of each
VAR equation is a random walk with drift. The sum-of-coefficients
prior and the dummy-initial-observation prior are necessary to
account for unit root and cointegration. Because the posterior does
not admit analytical characterization, even under Gaussianity of the
likelihood function, an MCMC algorithm is used for inference, based
on a Metropolis step to draw the vector of hyper-parameters and
on a standard Gibbs sampler to draw the model’s parameters condi-
tional on the former. From the conditional posterior distribution we
extract 20,000 draws, of which the first 10,000 are discarded and the
last 10,000 are used for inference on monetary policy shocks. Further
details on the prior specification and estimation procedure can be
found in Giannone et al. (2015).
This framework allows to estimate the VAR in levels, with variables
expressed in annualized terms. Specifically, our model consists of n =
13 monthly variables, both US-specific and international variables.
We wish to include many US and global variables for two reasons.
First, we want to identify the monetary policy shocks by imposing sign
restrictions in the spirit of the findings in the structural VAR literature
for as many variables as possible. This implies that in addition to
output and inflation, we need to include several interest rates and
spreads in our VAR for which authors like GK find an effect of monetary
policy. Second, given the open-economy focus of our study, as well
as including the US nominal effective exchange rate, we also need to
control for global drivers of economic and financial fluctuations. The
US economy variables comprise industrial production (IP), the CPI, the
Federal Funds rate, the 1-year government bond yield, the S&P500
index, the dollar nominal effective exchange rate against 20 trading
partners, the corporate bond spread, the mortgage spread and the
commercial paper spread. The last three variables are the same as in
GK. The global variables consist of the CRB commodity price index,
world industrial production (excluding construction) as calculated by
the OECD, (ex-US) world stock prices, and the difference between a
“G7”ex-USshort-terminterestrateandtheUS3-monthT-bill rate.The
former rate is computed as an average of the short-term rates of the
four major currency areas (Canada, Euro Area, Japan, UK).9 As variables
are monthly and enter the VAR in levels, the model is estimated with
p = 13 lags.
2.2. Identification
We find it convenient to impose priors to identify US mone-
tary policy shocks through sign restrictions on the impulse response
functions, following the well-known methods pioneered by Faust
(1998), Canova and De Nicoló (2002), and Uhlig (2005). A notable
difference from these early contributions is that our goal is not to
obtain new independent evidence on the effects of monetary policy
shocks through minimal identifying assumptions. Rather, we use
sign restrictions to impose plausible, “textbook” assumptions on
the overall domestic effects of monetary policy shocks. Conditional
9 The 3-month T-bill rate is used for UK, the call money rate for Japan, the 3-month
Euribor for the euro area and the general T-bill rate for Canada.
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on the assumed domestic effects, we then investigate the cross-
border repercussions of US monetary policy shocks. Operationally,
we impose restrictions consistent with the effects of US monetary
policy estimated by GK, which are illustrative of the findings in
the VAR literature on monetary non-neutralities. These authors use
external instruments, based on high-frequency financial data (see
also e.g., Gürkaynak et al., 2005), to identify monetary policy shocks,
including the period over which US short-term interest rates have
been at their lower bound. While their findings in terms of responses
of macroeconomic variables such as industrial production and infla-
tion are well in line with those from other VAR studies and standard
monetary theory (see e.g., Galí, J, 2015 textbook), a distinct feature of
their results is that they also estimate the responses of a broad range
of government and private bond interest rates.
Given our interest in the financial transmission through asset
prices, we rely on their findings to model the contemporaneous
responses of these variables. Another advantage of drawing on the GK
estimates is that they identify monetary policy shocks whose effects
are reasonably robust to the presence of the lower bound on short-
term interest rates. Thus, we can also hope that our identification is
equally robust to the inclusion of the period that encompasses the
recent financial crisis. While we will look at results both including
or excluding this most recent period after 2008, the latter could be
important to identify the transmission of US monetary policy shocks.
On the one hand, to the extent that the systematic reaction of mon-
etary policy has been constrained by the lower bound on short-term
rates, this has effectively resulted in a series of contractionary mon-
etary shocks. This intuition is borne out by standard New Keynesian
models in which systematic monetary policy follows a rule for the
short-term interest rate and is constrained by the lower bound.10 On
the other hand, when the lower bound binds, the current level of the
short-term rate may not be a good gauge of the stance of monetary
policy by itself, if the central bank is able to credibly rely on forward
guidance and thus still affect longer-dated interest rates. Neglecting
this aspect may then result in an overestimation of the size of con-
tractionary shocks over this period. Our identification in this respect
possesses a key safeguard as we require that a contractionary shock
not only increases the short-term rate (relative to its normal level
in line with macroeconomic conditions), but that also the 1-year
rate and a series of interest rate spreads go up.11 Therefore, any lack
of accommodation in short-term rates over the more recent period
will be interpreted as a contractionary shock only if associated with
increases in all these other longer-dated interest rates (and as we
discuss below also with both dollar appreciation and an increase in
the US interest differential with other major currencies).
In principle, we could have used the same external instruments as
in GK to identify US monetary policy shocks with our reduced form
VAR residuals. We prefer to pursue a different approach for several
reasons.12 First, our approach does not require literally imposing the
same identifying assumptions as in GK. Indeed, it is well-known that
sign restrictions yield a plurality of orthogonalizations of reduced
10 Of course, the risk here is that the effects of these contractionary shocks are also
commingled with those of other underlying shocks. However, as we show below, our
results are reasonably similar for the two samples including or excluding the period
2009–2013.
11 In this respect, we are focusing on what Gürkaynak et al. (2005) dub a “path”
shock to interest rates.
12 Indeed, we could have used GK instruments directly in IV estimates of regressions
of third-countries’ variables on US interest rates. However, the results in Ramey (2016)
are a source of concern in this respect. This author shows that the GK instruments and
shocks may be rather weak and lead to inconclusive results in a single equation setting
like the one we use below, even when applied to US data, especially concerning the
estimated effects on output and inflation. In practice, we do find that the GK shocks
result in an increase in US industrial production in a regression like Eq. (2), in sharp
contrast to the VAR impulse responses in their paper. This is a further reason to seek
alternative and potentially sharper instruments with our approach.
form VAR residuals. In this respect, our assumptions are less restric-
tive, but still compatible with the effects of monetary policy in a wide
range of both empirical and theoretical models, including estimated
and calibrated DSGE models. Second, we obtain a longer series of
monetary policy shocks as we impose our restrictions on the whole
sample starting in 1980, rather than the shorter one for which their
external instruments are available. Finally, we also want to focus on
US monetary policy shocks which should be at most weakly corre-
lated with monetary policy shocks in other major countries. This is
especially a concern in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis,
when short-term interest rates in most advanced economies have
been at their lower bound, as more or less contemporaneously very
expansionary conventional (and unconventional) monetary policies
have been deployed. The inclusion of the interest rate differential
with ex-US G7 is also likely to make our results more robust to the
risk of giving too much weight to contractionary shocks during the
more recent period. This is similar to the argument above regarding
the inclusion of other longer-dated interest rates and spreads. Any
deviation of the US short-term rate over this period from its esti-
mated systematic relation with the underlying state of the economy
is going to be mapped into a discretionary lack of accommodation
and thus a contractionary monetary policy shock only if associated
with a higher interest rate than in the other major economies. We
thus recover shocks that also satisfy, at least on impact, the follow-
ing requirements. First, a measure of short-term rates in other major
currencies should react less than one-to-one to US rates; second, the
US nominal effective exchange rate appreciates.
In more detail, we impose the following restrictions:
FFR > 0 for t = 1, . . . , 6
IPUS < 0 for t = 2, . . . , 6
CPIUS ≤ 0 for t = 4
1Y − GBYUS > 0 for t = 1, . . . , 4
MSUS > 0 for t = 2
CPSUS > 0 for t = 1, 2, 3
SPUS < 0 for t = 1
NEERUS > 0 for t = 1
DiffIR < 0 for t = 1
Here FFR is the Fed Funds rate, IPUS is the US industrial produc-
tion, CPIUS is the US consumer price index, 1Y − GBYUS are 1-year
government bond yields, MSUS is the mortgage spread, CPSUS is the
commercial paper spread, SPUS is the S&P500 index, NEERUS is the
nominal effective exchange rate, and DiffIR is the difference between
the G7 interest rate and the US short-term rate. The first six restric-
tions are consistent with the results in GK as reported in their
Figs. 2–8. Moreover, a persistent contraction in industrial produc-
tion is a fairly widespread finding in the literature on the effects of
US monetary policy shocks. Similarly, we impose that inflation be
negative after four months, striking a compromise between studies
imposing a fall on impact (e.g., Uhlig, 2005) and the evidence of a
delayed response.13
We also impose that US stock prices fall on impact, and that
the nominal effective exchange rate appreciates, while DiffIR < 0.
As discussed above, the last two restrictions help in ensuring the
identification of a US-specific monetary policy shock. The fall in the
13 We did not conduct a search specification on the number and timing of periods for
which we impose our restrictions. As it is clear from the estimated impulse responses
in Fig. 1, we obtain effects that are in general more persistent than assumed. For
instance, the CPI falls already on impact even though it is restricted to do so only
after 4 months. Therefore, marginal changes to these restrictions are likely to have
little effects on our baseline results.
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interest differential does not require interest rates in other major
currencies to fall, but only that they increase by less than their US
counterparts on impact. Observe that these assumptions are conser-
vative for our purposes, as we are constraining interest rates in major
currencies to increase by less than US rates and thus to be more accom-
modative, other things equal. This can then result in an attenuation
of the effects of US monetary policy on the rest of the world.
Finally, the impulse response functions of the remaining four
variables we include are left unrestricted. Namely, the US corporate
bond spread, commodity prices, world industrial production, and
world stock prices are free to react to the shock according to the data.
These last three variables then will provide initial unrestricted evi-
dence of the aggregate effects of US monetary policy shocks on the
rest of the world.
The algorithm to estimate the posterior distribution of impulse
response functions and of monetary policy shocks is standard (see
Uhlig, 2005). As discussed above, we obtain 10,000 draws from
the conditional posterior distributions of the reduced-form coeffi-
cients and variance–covariance matrix. Recall that any candidate
contemporaneous response to the vector of structural shocks can be
calculated as
H = PQ ,
where P is the Choleski factor of the variance matrix of the reduced
form innovations, S = PP ′, and Q an orthogonal matrix obtained
from the following decomposition
X = QR,
where X is the realization of a matrix of independent N(0, 1). Thus,
for each of our 10,000 reduced-form draws, 5000 random orthogo-
nalizations Q of the variance–covariance matrix are evaluated, dis-
carding those that do not satisfy the sign restrictions. This amounts
to assuming a uniform prior over the set of all possible Q matri-
ces, multiplied by an indicator function taking a value one for those
Qs that satisfy the restrictions. These Qs are then used to compute
candidate monetary shocks from the associated reduced form resid-
uals; namely we have that
eMPUS,t = (PQ)
−1et = (PQ)−1 (Yt − BYt−1) .
The algorithm always finds at least one suitable orthogonalization
for more than 99% of the draws from the conditional posterior distri-
butions. Therefore, our restrictions do not implausibly constrain the
reduced form BVAR posterior.
A subtle issue with this approach is that since it admits many
equally plausible structural models (Q matrices), it recovers many
equally plausible time series of monetary policy shocks (eMPUS,t). These
series can be quite different one from the other. On the one hand,
only one of these models is the “true” one and all the others are
“wrong”. This would imply that the shocks obtained from all the
other “wrong” structural models are linear combinations of the
“true” monetary policy shocks and other shocks. From this perspec-
tive, this is a limitation of our approach.14 On the other hand, our
methodology implies that we do not need to commit to one sin-
gle structural model, that we would regard as (un)likely as all the
others which satisfy our sign restrictions. In other words, all these
models are observationally equivalent, so that we would not learn
14 However, we can always find ways to select just one model that we would consider
most plausible. For instance we could pick the matrix Q that in addition to satisfying
our restrictions also maximizes the correlation of our shocks with other monetary
policy shocks, such as the GK shocks or the Romer and Romer (2004) shocks, or both.
which one is “true” even with an infinite amount of data. In this vein,
the monetary shocks we obtain are all plausible candidate shocks,
as are all the associated Q matrices that satisfy sign restrictions, and
we take fully into account the uncertainty over all of these shocks,
in the same fashion as we do when we estimate impulse responses
(as implied by the uncertainty over the Q matrices). The hope is that
these potentially different shocks nevertheless have similar enough
effects to provide informative evidence. Moreover, any serious con-
tamination by other shocks should be quite apparent already in the
BVAR results. As we show below (see Section 4), these results are
quite conventional and similar to those obtained in the literature.
We conclude this subsection by briefly discussing some aspects of
the priors on impulse responses elicited by this procedure. Recently,
Baumeister and Hamilton (2015) have argued that sign restrictions
can unduly constrain impulse response posteriors. These authors
show that the effects of this kind of priors do not vanish asymp-
totically, a property shared by all priors on impulse responses in
under-identified models (i.e., which admit more than one matrix
Q). Moreover, sign restrictions imply priors on impulse responses
that tend to put sizable probability mass on values close to zero
for restricted variables, and literally at zero for unrestricted vari-
ables. At the same time, possibly large but implausible responses
also receive non-zero probability. Therefore, it is important to have
some sense of how much posteriors differ from implicit priors. In
the web appendix we report the posterior distributions of the impact
responses of restricted and unrestricted variables. We find that these
posteriors tend to have densities with little mass close to zero or on
extreme values, and thus are in most cases reasonably different from
priors.
2.3. Estimation of the impact on countries other than the US
The above procedure, in addition to yield the posterior distribu-
tion for the impulse response functions from the BVAR, allows us
to obtain the posterior distribution of US monetary policy shocks.
Both equally result from the uncertainty over reduced form parame-
ters (S, B), as summarized by their respective posterior distributions,
and over matrices Q, as summarized by our prior. Armed with these
shocks, for each variable y in country i, yi, we compute a vector of





for all the countries in our sample other than the US. Under the
assumption that the monetary policy shocks are exogenous, we can
arbitrarily approximate the true impulse responses by regressing
each variable yit on an infinite series of eMPUS,t−j, j = 0, . . . , ∞. Following
the literature (e.g., Romer and Romer, 2004), given the finite sample
constraint, we obtain the impulse response coefficients by estimat-
ing, for a given series of shocks eMPUS,t , the following distributed lag
model for each variable:
yit = ai,j + 0i(L)yi,t−1 + bi (L) eMPUS,t + eit , (2)
where we also include monthly or quarterly dummies and a time
trend. Variables are transformed as in the BVAR. A unitary shock,
eMPUS,t = 1, thus amounts to a one-standard deviation structural shock,
as in the BVAR impulses responses.
We characterize uncertainty of estimates of Eq. (2) by comput-
ing their distributions over the realizations of our estimated shocks
eMPUS,t , to take into account that the latter are generated regressors.
In particular, we assume that conditional on both lags of yi,t and a
given realization of the series of monetary policy shocks eMPUS,t , the
error term in Eq. (2) is Gaussian N(0,s2). Together with a conjugate
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(Normal-IG) prior on the vector of coefficients C = (ai,j,0i,bi) and
on s2, this implies that the posterior for these coefficients is also a
standard Normal-IG. Therefore, we can easily draw from it to simu-
late the posterior of the impulse responses, conditional on the given
series of shocks. Repeating this procedure for a number of draws of
time series of the monetary shocks allows to simulate the posterior
distribution of the impulse responses taking into account also overall
uncertainty about the estimation of shocks.
In practice, we proceed as follows. We extract 10,000 time series
of the US monetary policy shocks following the procedure described
in the previous sub-section, and for each of them we also extract
10 draws from the conditional (Normal-IG) posterior of the regres-
sion parameters C, s2.15 Given the combined parameter and shock
uncertainty, relying on an uninformative prior over C, s2 would
result in very imprecise estimates. Thus, we pick the prior hyper-
parameters in the following way. First, similarly to the BVAR, we set
s2 ∼ IG(m = 3, 0.022). This implies that the variance of the Nor-
mal prior on the coefficients of Eq. (2) is then equal to s2I. Second,
we set the mean of the Normal prior over C equal to the OLS esti-
mates which are obtained in the regression using the time series of
the cross-sectional median values of our estimated monetary policy
shocks.16 We document in the online appendix the consequences of
usingthispriorformonthlyUSvariables(suchasindustrialproduction,
CPI, equity prices, the nominal and real effective exchange rate and
3-month and 12-month interest rates), for which we have also evi-
dence from the BVAR. First, the posterior distribution of impulse
responses we obtain is sufficiently different from the prior; there-
fore the latter, though informative, does not unduly affect the former.
Second, it is also interesting that the posterior distributions of US
variables computed with the single-equation procedure based on
Eq. (2) are similar to those of the impulse responses of the same vari-
ables obtained from the BVAR (reported in Fig. 1). While this property
may not be so relevant for countries other than the US, at least it
ensures some degree of consistency in our approach. We conclude
from this exercise that this prior choice strikes a reasonable balance
between making the US estimates based on Eq. (2) close to their BVAR
counterparts, a minimal consistency requirement, and imposing too
tight a constraint on the posterior inference.17
The flexibility of this approach represents a key advantage given
our quite heterogeneous panel of data. It allows us to consider vari-
ables at both monthly and quarterly frequency for each country i, as
discussed in the next section, also using samples shorter than those for
which we estimate our shocks. This heterogeneity in frequencies and
sample length prevents us to estimate directly impulse responses by
includingothercountries’variables inourBVAR.Nevertheless, relative
to a VAR, the single equation approach does not allow us to fully take
into account the possible influence of third variables, including the
presence of common stochastic trends. But in this respect, we need to
strike a balance between data constraints and an optimal model spec-
ification. Moreover, in addition to yielding results country by country
for each variable, it makes it convenient also to aggregate them across
countries on the basis of several characteristics. These aggregations
are obtained by taking the point-by-point median response for each
variables across countries belonging to a given group. The choice of the
15 Using 100 draws instead of 10 does not materially alter our results but greatly
increases the computational time.
16 Of course this time series of shocks does not correspond to any of the actual series we
estimate with our procedure; it just represents a convenient way to initialize our priors.
17 In a small sample like ours, there is no guarantee that impulse responses for the
same variables obtained from the BVAR and from Eq. (2) would be similar — see
e.g., Kilian and Kim (2011). Indeed, results here depend on the prior over the coefficients
of Eq. (2). When we experimented with less informative priors, either by increasing
the variance of the Normal prior for the coefficients or setting the mean of the latter
to zero, we found that the implied posteriors were now fairly different from those
estimated in the BVAR.
median is robust to the presence of outliers which could unduly influ-
ence the aggregation otherwise. Note that we do not pool the data, due
to significant heterogeneity in country-specific results, which could
give rise to an aggregation bias (see Pesaran and Smith, 1995).18
We group countries on the basis of the following characteristics:
a) income levels — advanced and emerging economies; b) exchange
rate regime; c) financial openness; d) US trade and dollar financial
exposure; and e) the incidence of commodity exports; the details of
these characteristics are described in the next section.
3. Data description
The tables in the web appendix describe in detail all variables used
in the empirical analysis and their sources. The Bayesian VAR model to
identify US monetary policy shocks consists of 13 monthly variables
which were discussed above (see also Table B1 in the web appendix).
In order to study the international effects of US monetary policy, a
large number of country-specific variables are regressed on the esti-
mated monetary policy shocks and the impulse response functions are
computed. Our sample consist of 36 countries, namely: Australia, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India,
Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands,
Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Thailand, Turkey and UK. We consider euro area countries
individually for all variables but short-term rates and bilateral US dol-
lar exchange rates. These series refer only to euro area aggregates after
1999 (or the date of euro adoption).
For each country we consider both monthly and quarterly vari-
ables. Monthly variables include the following: (i) the bilateral dol-
lar exchange rate;19 (ii) the real effective exchange rate; (iii) the
short-term interest rate differential with the US; (iv) CPI; (v) industrial
production; (vi) real stock prices (deflated with the CPI); the nom-
inal trade balance (scaled by the average of the sum of import and
export over the whole sample); and (viii) the differential of long-term
government bond yields vis-á-vis the US.
Quarterly variables include the following: (i) real GDP; (ii) the GDP
deflator; (iii) theunemploymentrate; (iv) realhousingprices(deflated
by CPI); (v) real domestic credit (deflated by CPI); (vi)–(vii) total port-
folio inflows and outflows, and (viii) total bank inflows, all scaled by
GDP. Finally, as a gauge of macroeconomic volatility we also report
results for the sum of the absolute changes in unemployment and
inflation (as measured by the GDP deflator), the so-called “misery
index”.20 Details about the source of each series are provided in the
tables in the online appendix.
The series of monetary policy shocks extracted from the BVAR
starts in February 1981 (as we use 13 lags in the model) so that the
regressions can be estimated from that date on. When coming to
quarterly regressions the monetary policy shocks are aggregated tak-
ing their quarterly average. These regressions are estimated starting
from Q2 1981. As some variables are not available over the whole
sample, we are forced to run some regressions over shorter samples,
as documented in the online appendix.
18 A further reason preventing us to use panel techniques relates to computational
difficulties inherent in our Bayesian approach to deal with the uncertainty in shock
estimates. Bayesian panel data analysis requires at least the use of Gibbs sampling (if
not full MCMC methods) to simulate posterior distributions conditional on a given
monetary shock time series. But this is hardly feasible given the large number of
draws we need to simulate from the empirical distribution of our shocks.
19 It is defined as the amount of local currency needed for 1$ so that an increase in
the exchange rate represents an appreciation of the US dollar.
20 The misery index as the sum of the inflation and unemployment rates is a simple
measure of economic welfare introduced by Arthur Okun in the 1970s. Of course, it
is only a crude measure, and has been criticised in later contributions. Therefore, we
interpret it only as a synthetic indicator of macroeconomic volatility.
L. Dedola et al. / Journal of International Economics 108 (2017) S23–S41 S29
3.1. Country characteristics
The second step of our analysis consists of aggregating the impulse
response functions of single-country variables according to several
country-specificcharacteristics.Oneimportantqualificationtokeepin
mind is that some of the country characteristics, notably the exchange
rate regime, may be selected endogenously. In particular, countries
with stronger links with the US and/or small open economies may be
morelikelytopegtothedollar.Therefore,apossiblenexusbetweenthe
exchange rate regime and the strength of monetary policy spillovers
from the US may reflect not only the regime as such, but possibly also
the country characteristics that predict the exchange rate regime.
We group countries on the basis of the following characteris-
tics: a) income levels — advanced and emerging economies; b) dollar
exchange rate regime; c) financial openness; d) US trade and dollar
financial exposure; and e) the incidence of commodity exports. Here
we describe the indicators used to derive country groups and their
sources.
Advanced vs. emerging economy
Theclassificationintoadvancedoremergingeconomyisconsistent
with the one in the IMF World Economic Outlook. In this case we refer
to the latest classification rather than the average over the sample.
Exchange rate regime
The classification of the exchange rate regime is not a straight-
forward one since there is more than one meaningful classification
(see Rose, 2011). We mainly draw from Klein and Shambaugh (2010),
who also have some information on the base country. Hence we rank
countries according to their exchange rate flexibility with the USD
following the index in Klein and Shambaugh (2010).
Financial openness
We measure financial openness with the Chinn–Ito index, which
is an indicator of de iure financial openness.
US trade exposure
We consider countries’ trade linkages with the United States
(exports to and imports from the US as a share of domestic GDP).
Dollar exposure
This is computed on the basis of data in Benetrix et al. (2015) on
the currency composition of gross foreign assets and liabilities. Here
we focus on gross rather than net exposure, although the choice is
not uncontroversial.
Commodity exporters
We define commodity exporters based on the incidence of net
exports of primary goods over total exports plus imports. Primary
goods include fuels (oil, gas, coal), metals, food and other raw
materials.
Table 1 displays the average sample values of the indicators used
to derive country groups (with the exclusion of the income level
and the share of commodity exports). Unless differently specified
(namely in the case of advanced vs emerging countries and commod-
ity exporters), countries are split in two different groups depending
on whether the value of their indicators fall above or below the
median value over the whole sample for which these characteristics
are computed. Table 2 reports the list of countries comprising the
respective groups. These groupings are then combined to derive sub-
groups of countries with several interesting common characteristics,
so that we also consider emerging floaters or peggers, emerging
financially open and emerging less-financially open countries, and
so on.
The use of average characteristics is in line with the approach in
e.g., Miniane and Rogers (2007), in which point impulse response
estimates are directly regressed on average characteristics over the
sample such as the intensity of capital controls. However, to the
extent that countries’ characteristics have not been very stable in
our sample, this approach can bias our results toward finding less
stark differences across country groupings. Unfortunately, for many
countries we simply don’t have the degrees of freedom to consider
time-varying characteristics in the individual regressions (Eq. (2)),
as this would imply a proliferation of interactions of the regressors
with a time-varying index for the different country characteristics.
This approach would make more sense using panel techniques; how-
ever, as already argued above, panel techniques raise computational
difficulties if we want to take into account the model uncertainty in
our estimates of the US monetary policy shocks.21
4. The domestic effects of US monetary policy shocks
We begin by presenting our results for a contractionary US
monetary policy shock in Fig. 1 for the BVAR estimated until the
end of 2013, the full sample period. As it is customary, the figure
reports the 16th, 50th (median) and 84th percentiles of the point
by point posterior distribution of the impulse responses (the dotted
red lines) in response to a one-standard deviation structural shock,
as well as the mean response.22 It is clear from the figure that the
typical response to the shocks is estimated to be stronger and longer-
lasting than assumed. The federal fund rate and the 1-year rate rise
persistently, with the median responses peaking around 10 basis
points. These responses are significant (i.e., the 16th percentile is
above zero) for each of the first 10 months. The interest rate hike is
associated with a shorter-lived widening in the mortgage spread, the
commercial paper spread and the corporate bond spread, where only
the latter’s response (which we leave unrestricted) is not significant
even on impact. As a result, the US price level, industrial production
and stock prices fall significantly on impact and in later periods, with
the effects dissipating (the 16th percentile becoming positive) one
year to 4 years out. The trough median responses are smaller for the
CPI (around −0.05%), and larger for stock prices (over −1%); the peak
median decline in industrial production is around −0.3%.
Finally, most international variables respond as would be
expected according to standard textbook predictions. The fall in
the interest differential closely mirrors the hike in US rates, and is
thus consistent with interest rates in other major currencies barely
responding; the dollar effective exchange rate strongly appreci-
ates, with a median response around 0.5%. The appreciation how-
ever is not significant at the 6-month horizon and thereafter, as
the 16th percentile returns below zero. Turning to the uncon-
strained variables, despite the dollar appreciation, industrial pro-
duction and stock prices fall in the rest of the world, while the
large median decrease in commodity prices is always bracketed
between a positive 16th percentile and negative 68th percentile. The
contraction in world industrial production and stock prices is sim-
ilar in magnitude to that in their US counterparts, albeit somehow
less persistent. These responses are consistent with a transmis-
sion involving substantial complementarity between US and foreign
manufacturing goods or a limited degree of expenditure switching —
see e.g., Corsetti et al. (2010).
The impulse responses estimated excluding the most recent
period after 2008 are broadly similar to those in Fig. 1, qualitatively
and in most cases quantitatively — see Fig. 2. Notable exceptions
21 An alternative could be to use informative priors on the time variation, obviously
at the risk of unduly constraining posterior inference.
22 Although we follow the conventional way to report results from the impulse
response posterior, it should be clear that neither the median nor any other percentiles
should be interpreted as arising from a specific orthogonalization matrix Q. Indeed,
each point can result not only from a different orthogonalization matrix Q, but also
from a different realization of the reduced form (B,S) — see Uhlig (2005).
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Table 1
Average sample values of country characteristics.
Country Lane and Shambaugh (2010) dollar peg Chinn and Ito (2006) capital openness Benetrix et al. (2015) dollar exposure Trade exposure
Australia 0 1.422 51,771 4,09%
Austria 0 1.903 42,402 2,30%
Belgium 0 1.713 97,406 9,41%
Brazil 0 −1.147 34,089 3,71%
Canada 0.147 2.439 97,251 38,30%
Chile 0.059 −0.325 76,571 8,64%
China 0.618 −1.318 35,067 4,93%
Colombia 0 −1.149 44,366 8,29%
Czech Republic 0 1.559 33,450 2,58%
Denmark 0 1.719 69,907 2,88%
Estonia 0 2.390 18,112 3,11%
Finland 0 1.903 46,878 2,95%
France 0 1.410 46,067 2,57%
Germany 0 2.439 39,907 3,72%
Greece 0 0.487 14,873 1,13%
Hungary 0 0.272 24,311 2,53%
India 0.176 −1.169 24,344 2,24%
Italy 0 1.334 26,168 2,35%
Japan 0 2.348 46,915 4,54%
Korea 0.147 −0.361 41,999 11,56%
Latvia 0.045 2.307 24,785 1,31%
Lithuania 0.364 2.258 23,753 2,42%
Malaysia 0.353 1.025 68,766 22,54%
Mexico 0.147 0.435 44,349 27,30%
Netherlands 0 2.439 95,219 5,82%
Norway 0 1.237 72,906 3,20%
Philippines 0.147 −0.409 50,386 12,53%
Poland 0 −0.854 26,576 1,15%
Portugal 0 1.056 18,342 2,35%
Russia 0.045 −0.320 60,264 2,31%
South Africa 0 −1.309 30,956 4,28%
Spain 0 1.279 22,996 1,93%
Sweden 0 1.821 68,828 3,95%
Thailand 0.382 −0.245 41,979 10,94%
Turkey 0 −0.827 31,094 2,02%
UK 0 2.390 207,213 4,47%
concern the response of the mortgage spread and especially the com-
mercial paper spread, which is now smaller than when the period
after 2008 is included. Conversely, the response of the corporate
bond spread is now significant at the 6-month horizon. However,
with the exception of the commercial paper spread, these responses
would be included in the percentiles estimated over the whole
sample.
We conclude this section by reporting on a few exercises we
carry out to provide further corroboration of our results. First, we re-
estimate the BVAR impulse responses by dropping the interest rate
differential (not shown here to save on space). We find that most
of these impulse responses are similar to those in Fig. 1, but there
are some notable differences. In particular, the responses of inter-
est rates are now significant for many more periods, with the 16th
percentile staying positive for more than 40 months. Moreover, the
responses of several variables are somehow larger than in Fig. 1,
especially those of the international variables. When we reestimate
the VAR over the sample ending in 2008 again omitting the inter-
est rate differential, instead results are very similar to those in Fig. 2.
As discussed above, this difference underscores the importance of
including the short-term interest rate differential in our analysis to
make results more robust to the inclusion of the most recent period
with interest rates at their lower bound. Indeed, this interest rate
differential has been as stable over this period as US short-term
rates.
Second, we report in Fig. 3 the distribution of correlations of our
shocks with the (point estimates of the) GK shocks and also the
extended series of the Romer and Romer (2004) shocks as computed
by Barakchian and Crowe (2013). The correlations are mostly posi-
tive in both cases. As shown in Table 3, median values range between
0.12 and 0.21, depending on the shocks and the samples. These val-
ues are similar to that of the correlation between the GK and RR
shocks, equal to 0.19.23
Third, we computed impulse responses of the monthly US VIX
index to our identified shocks, again using a specification like Eq. (2).24
We could not include the VIX directly in the BVAR because it is avail-
able only after the early 1990s. This could be an important omission
in light of the results in Rey (2013), where the VIX, taken as a proxy
for the “global financial cycle”, is shown to be correlated with capi-
tal flows and asset prices across countries, as well as to increase in
response to a US monetary policy tightening. Fig. 4 reports the impulse
responses of the VIX to our monetary policy shocks, estimated again
over both samples. Similarly to the impulses responses in the previous
figures, the (blue) dotted lines represent the point-by-point 16th, 50th
and 84th percentiles. It is clear that an unexpected monetary tight-
ening in the US, as measured by our shocks, results in a substantial
(around 7% on impact, in response to a one-standard deviation struc-
tural monetary policy shock) and fairly persistent increase in the VIX,
in line with the results in Rey (2013). The responses are also broadly
similar across the 1990–2008 and 1990–2013 samples. This finding,
together with our result that US and especially global stock prices fall
in response to a US interest rate hike, shows that our estimated mon-
etary policy shocks are consistent with salient features of the effect of
US monetary policy on key global financial variables as documented
by Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2015).
23 We also checked the first order autocorrelation coefficient of our estimated
monetary policy shocks, whose median value is around 0.05 over the whole sample.
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a The sources and references for our classifications are the following:
– Income level from IMF World Economic Outlook.
– Commodity exporters based on the incidence of net exports of primary goods (fuels, metals, food and other raw materials) over total exports plus imports, UNCTAD data.
– For other classifications see Table 1.
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Table 3
Correlations between Romer and Romer’s (2004), Gertler and Karadi’s (2015) and our
shocks.a
Shocks Mean Median Max Min
R&R with MPS 2013 0.13 0.13 0.39 −0.13
R&R with MPS 2008 0.12 0.12 0.34 −0.12
G&K with MPS 2013 0.15 0.15 0.38 −0.07
G&K with MPS 2008 0.21 0.21 0.43 −0.06
G&K with R&R 0.19
a The Romer and Romer’s shocks are the updated series from Barakchian and Crowe
(2013).
To summarize, these exercises together lend reasonable sup-
port to our benchmark identification and the effects of the resulting
monetary policy shocks.
5. Evidence on the global transmission of US monetary policy
shocks
In the next subsection we provide a broad overview of the country
specific responses to the US monetary policy shocks. In Section 5.2
we explore whether these responses have any commonality that can
be attributed to shared country characteristics. Before going into the
details of the results, it is useful to provide an overview of the key
findings. First, a surprise US monetary tightening leadsto a dollar
Fig. 1. IRFs from baseline BVAR estimated over the sample 1980–2013.
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Fig. 2. IRFs from baseline BVAR estimated over the sample 1980–2008.
appreciation vis-á-vis most countries in our sample. In a large majority
of countries industrial production and real GDP fall, and unemploy-
ment rises; however the trade balance improves. Inflation (both GDP
deflator and CPI) also falls in a majority of countries, although the
effects are less statistically significant. Emerging economies tend to
experience more volatile macroeconomic effects. At the same time,
and this is our second finding, the responses of financial variables
are more heterogeneous: while most countries see their bond yields
increase relative to the US, real equity and housing prices drop in
about half the countries. Likewise, many countries experience oppo-
site effects on real credit and capital flows, including borrowing
from foreign banks. Finally, we do not find any of systematic rela-
tions between the most likely country characteristics (income level,
exchange rate regime, financial openness, trade openness vs. the US,
dollar exposure and commodity exporting) and the distribution of
cross-country responses to US monetary policy shocks (in Section 5.2).
While a dollar peg at least mutes the effects on the nominal and real
exchange rate, asset prices and capital flows do not seem to react
differently between more and less financially open countries.
5.1. The cross-country distribution of the effects of US monetary policy
shocks
We summarize the effects across countries of US monetary policy
shocks in Fig. 5. For each variable the figure reports a chart with the
maximum absolute value over an horizon of 5 years of the median
responses to a one-standard deviation monetary shock, country by
country.25 The responses in advanced economies are depicted in blue
25 Of course, as noted before, the median response may well reflect the effects of
different monetary policy shocks across countries and variables.
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Fig. 3. Correlations between our estimated shocks and (i) Gertler and Karadi (2015) shocks, and (ii) updated Romer and Romer shocks from Barakchian and Crowe (2013).
bars, those of emerging economies in red bars. The peak impulse
response for the euro area is reported in yellow, and the overall
country average in black to the far right-hand side of each chart.
Fig. 4. VIX responses to US monetary policy shocks, monthly regressions.
Recall that euro area countries are not included individually in the
case of the bilateral dollar exchange rate and of short-term rates.
The first panel of Fig. 5 shows the maximum absolute responses
of monthly variables, while the second panel shows the maximum
absolute responses for quarterly variables — see Section 3 for the list
of variables included.
Starting with the first panel in Fig. 5, it is apparent that virtually
all countries experience a nominal bilateral depreciation (a positive
value) with the US dollar.26 The largest significant depreciation,
almost 1.4%, occurs in Hungary. The response is not significant for a
few currencies, in particular for countries managing their exchange
rate vis-á-vis the US dollar, such as China. However, the euro depre-
ciation, while showing a large median peak of 1.3%, is not significant
too. The widespread bilateral dollar depreciation transpires into a
broad based real depreciation (a negative value) in more than half
of the countries, mostly advanced ones. However, only in a few
countries the responses are now statistically significant.27 Sweden
experiences the largest significant peak depreciation, −0.5%; the
largest significant real appreciation, 0.5%, takes place in China.
Cross-country heterogeneity in the responses of other asset prices
is larger. Short-term interest rates tend to moderately fall rela-
tive to the US in advanced countries; e.g., the peak differential
is −11 basis points in the euro area. They increase, sometimes siz-
ably, in emerging ones, such as Chile, where the peak differential is 62
basis points. The responses of differentials in longer-term yields are
more similar across countries, displaying a generalized small increase
(Greek bonds experience the largest significant positive differential,
56 basis points). However the differential turns negative in a few
emerging economies (the largest relative fall, −80 basis points, occurs
in Turkey). Finally, against the background of a 1% drop in the US, stock
prices fall in most emerging markets and several advanced economies;
some countries however experience significant increases.28
Conversely, the sign of the responses of macroeconomic variables
is quite similar across economies. Industrial production and the CPI
fall in most countries, while the trade balance improves. The decline
in industrial production is fairly significant in a majority of countries
(the largest in Lithuania at −1.2%), and among advanced economies
(−0.8% in Japan). Euro area IP also significantly contracts, by −0.5%.
26 The exception is Estonia, whose appreciation however is not significant as it is
bracketed between the 16th and 84th percentile. Brazil’s responses for the dollar
exchange rate, the CPI and the short-term differential are not shown as they are very
large (standing at −9.86, −10.66 and 493.18, respectively) and imprecisely estimated.
27 The real effective exchange rate is now reported for all members for the euro area
separately. On aggregate, the euro depreciates in real terms but not significantly.
28 Lithuanian stock prices fall significantly the most, −2.8% (Norwegian stocks
by −1.3% the most among advanced countries); the largest significant increase occurs
in China, almost 4%; the euro area increase is not significant.
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Fig. 5. Country-specific median peak impulse responses to a one standard deviation contractionary US monetary policy shock. a. Monthly regressions. b. Quarterly regressions.
Sample period: 1980 - 2013. Note that we exclude inflation, the nominal exchange rate and the interest rate differential in Brazil as well as bank inflows into China due to very
high values. Blue bars refer to advanced countries, red bars to emerging countries. The peak impulse response for the euro area is reported in yellow, and the overall country
average in black to the very right.
Interestingly, these falls are bigger than the US own response. In
contrast, the few positive responses are never significant. The CPI dis-
plays a similar, generalized reduction. For instance, nominal prices
significantly fall in the euro area, by −0.1% (Malaysian CPI decreases
the most, by −0.2%). The trade balance improves in most coun-
tries, both advanced and emerging; however, countries like Norway
and Russia experience especially significant and large deteriorations
(by −0.8% and −1% respectively).29
Turning to the second panel of Fig. 5, we also find that the effects
on quarterly macroeconomic variables such as the real GDP and
29 The largest significant improvement, 2.4%, takes place in Turkey; among advanced
economies in Greece, by 1.4%.
its deflator, and unemployment, do not greatly differ in sign across
countries. The real GDP contraction is statistically significant in a
majority of countries, including the euro area as a whole, where
the peak effect is −0.5%. Unemployment rises in around half of the
countries (the largest responses of real GDP and unemployment,
at −1.75% and 1%, occur in Lithuania). The fall in the GDP deflator is
also less widespread than the real GDP contraction, and more muted
(Malaysia, whose CPI also falls significantly, experiences the largest
drop, −1.4%). Both variables are barely affected in the euro area, the
GDP deflator despite the significant decline in the CPI reported above.
We find a great deal more heterogeneity across countries in
the responses of financial variables and capital flows. Real housing
prices decline in many emerging economies, but are large and
significant especially in the Baltic countries. Advanced economies
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Fig. 6. Responses of advanced (solid red line) and emerging economies (dotted blue line) to US monetary policy shocks. a. Monthly regressions. b. Quarterly regressions.
tend to experience small but generally little significant increases,
including the euro area. The response of real private credit varies a
great deal across countries, falling in several emerging economies,
although with little statistical significance, but also in advanced
economies like Belgium, where it declines by a significant −0.6%.
However, the generally positive responses in advanced economies
are also rather muted. Finally, capital flows, including borrow-
ing from foreign banks (all scaled by nominal GDP), display quite
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Fig. 7. Responses of EMEs with lower (solid red line) and higher capital mobility (dotted blue line) to US monetary policy shocks. a. Monthly regressions. b. Quarterly regressions.
different effects in sign and size. Cumulated portfolio inflows by
foreign residents but also outflows by domestics decline in a major-
ity of countries, including many advanced economies. For instance,
even the euro area experiences a significant decline in portfo-
lio inflows of around −1%. The decline in outflows, though also
large at over −4%, is not significant. Total borrowing from foreign
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the average country characteristic (dollar peg) over the whole sample (x axis).
Fig. 8. Country-specific median peak impulse response against average country characteristics.
banks displays many positive and negative responses across both
advanced and emerging countries. However positive responses tend
to be significant in a majority of the former, negative responses
in a majority of the latter.30 For instance, borrowing from foreign
banks significantly soars in Denmark by 11% and drops by −4.7% in
Turkey.
To summarize, a US surprise tightening brings about a
widespread dollar appreciation and a fall in broad macroeconomic
activity, with an improvement in trade balances in nominal terms.
Inflation also tends to fall in most countries, although less sharply.
Emerging economies experience more volatile macroeconomic
effects, as summarized by the “misery index”. Among financial vari-
ables, the increase in long-term government bond differentials and,
in a more limited fashion, the drop in equity prices are also fairly
generalized. Conversely, the response of short-term rates differen-
tials and housing prices is more heterogeneous. By the same token,
several countries experience opposite effects on real private credit
and capital flows, especially borrowing from foreign banks.
5.2. Country characteristics and the effects of US monetary policy
shocks
In the following, we find it convenient to organize the results for
both monthly and quarterly regressions by country groupings. There-
fore, for each figure, the first panel (a) will show impulse responses
30 Lithuania displays the very large negative response in the chart, which is however
not significant. We do not report the much larger Chinese negative response, standing
at −117.21.
obtained from monthly regressions, while the second panel (b) will
depict impulse responses obtained from quarterly regressions. As
before, the figures report the point-by-point 16th, 50th and 84th
percentiles of the impulses responses taking the median across
country groups. The latter are described in Table 2.
5.2.1. Advanced vs. emerging countries
We start by presenting results by splitting countries on the basis
of their income levels (see first and second column in Table 2), as
displayed in Fig. 6. The percentiles of distribution of the median
responses of the 18 AEs are shown in the solid (red) lines, while those
of the 18 EMEs are shown in dotted (blue) lines. These responses
confirm and extend our previous results that a US monetary policy
shock has substantial cross-border effects. Panel (a) shows that in the
“typical” country in the rest of the world, an unexpected interest rate
tightening is associated with depreciation both nominally against the
US dollar and on a real trade-weighted basis — whereas a fall again
indicates depreciation. While for both AEs and EMEs all percentiles of
the bilateral dollar rate are positive on impact and for some periods
after (the bilateral depreciation is significant for both groups), for
the real exchange rate the percentiles are all negative only in AEs
(the real depreciation is significant only for this group). Industrial
production significantly declines across the board, while stock prices
do so significantly only in EMEs. These variables seem to react simi-
larly to their BVAR analogs, and thus to the US counterparts, though
in a less persistent fashion. The responses of other variables are also
very similar across the AEs and EMEs groups. The trade balance sig-
nificantly improves in both groups of countries, while the decline
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the average country characteristic (financial openness) over the whole sample (x axis).
Fig. 9. Country-specific median peak impulse response against average country characteristics.
in the CPI and short-term interest differentials tends to be esti-
mated more precisely in AEs. The response of the long-term interest
differential is not precisely estimated for either group.
The responses of quarterly variables displayed in panel (b) con-
firm and further sharpen these results. In both AEs and EMEs groups,
the contraction in industrial production is also associated with a fall
in broad-based output as measured by real GDP, and an increase
in unemployment. The median fall in the GDP deflator is never
significant, however, in either group. The median increase in real
credit is marginally significant only in EMEs. But some interesting
quantitative differences emerge from the responses of other finan-
cial variables. The responses on housing prices and portfolio inflows
are quite dispersed in the AEs group, but they tend to significantly
decline among emerging economies. Conversely, the effects on port-
folios outflows by domestic residents are not precisely estimated in
either country groups.
A first important result then is that the repercussions of a US mon-
etary policy shock on economic activity are qualitatively and quan-
titatively similar across advanced and emerging economies, since a
US tightening brings about a recession and an increase in unem-
ployment in both groups. Inflation and interest rate dynamics are
also broadly similar, but with higher dispersion and volatility among
EMEs than among AEs. As a result, macroeconomic volatility as cap-
tured by the sum of absolute changes in inflation and unemployment
(the “misery index”), tends to be marginally higher for EMEs than for
AEs. On the other hand, some negative financial spillovers are esti-
mated more sharply for EMEs, especially concerning asset prices, and
foreign capital outflows.
5.2.2. Other country characteristics: financial openness, currency
regime, commodity exports and US trade and dollar exposure
We turn next to the analysis of the effects of other country-
specific dimensions on the transmission of US monetary policy
shocks with a view of exploring some of the possible reasons behind
the asymmetric response across countries. Specifically, among
emerging markets, we consider differences in the exchange rate
regime, the degree of capital mobility, trade openness toward the US
and US dollar exposure, and the incidence of commodity exports.31
Surprisingly, we find that none of the chosen characteristics appears
to explain country heterogeneity.32 To save on space, in Fig. 7 we
thus present results only for the degree of capital mobility (results for
other characteristics are available in the online appendix). Although
impulse responses are sometimes different between groups, they
overlap in most cases, so that their difference is never statistically
significant. This includes also the responses of capital and banking
flows between the two groups of EMEs with higher and lower capital
mobility in panel (b) of Fig. 7. By the same token, we do not detect
large discrepancies in the exchange rate regime vs. the US dollar (see
the online appendix). Even in the case of the bilateral exchange rate,
31 We focus on emerging markets because financial openness tends to be uniformly
higher in advanced countries. AEs are also all classified as floating relative to the dollar
according to the Klein–Shambaugh metric. Likewise, most commodity exporters are
EMEs.
32 Results do not change for these last three characteristics when we look at different
degrees of exposure and commodity exports among all countries, or among advanced
economies only.
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which as expected reacts less in dollar pegs than in other countries,
the difference is not large and indeed not statistically significant.
Also the interest rate reaction does not seem to significantly dif-
fer between pegs and floats, differently from previous results in the
literature (e.g., Shambaugh, 2004).
Our results so far, however, are predicated on the assumption that
country characteristics are constant across the sample and can be
summarised as 0–1 dummies. Several country characteristics, such
as differences in income levels, are relatively persistent, but not all
of them are necessarily so. For example, there is some time variation
in the foreign exchange regime. Some of the countries we classify as
dollar pegs over the whole sample, in reality have had also spells of
floating rates. This is the case of India and Mexico, for instance, which
seem thus closer to an intermediate exchange rate regime over the
whole sample. By the same token, several countries have an interme-
diate degree of financial openness, often the results of incremental
measures of financial liberalization. Time variation in some charac-
teristics can thus account for the lack of sharp differences between
some groups, especially concerning the effects of the exchange rate
regime.
We try to address some of these concerns in a robustness exer-
cise in which we relate the effects of US monetary policy shocks to
the actual sample averages of the two key country characteristics for
the question of the trilemma, as measured by the actual values of
the indices of dollar exchange rate flexibility (Klein–Shambaugh) and
financial openness (Chinn–Ito), as reported in Table 1. The indexes
can now take a whole range of values, capturing in a less coarse way
the degree of variation across countries. Figs. 8 and 9 report scatter
plots of the median peak impulse responses of each variables against
the sample average of these two characteristics.
Fig. 8 now shows that countries with a higher value of the index
(i.e., countries which have a less flexible dollar exchange rate on
average) display a smaller effect of US monetary shocks on the bilat-
eral exchange rate. Likewise, these countries tend to experience a
smaller depreciation of their trade-weighted real exchange rate, and
in several cases even an appreciation (a positive value in the plot).
Moreover, some of the largest drops in industrial production and also
equity prices occur in countries with a less flexible dollar exchange
rate. More surprisingly, these countries, however, also display a more
negative short-term interest rate differential and inflation. At the
same time, and in line with our previous results, we find no evidence
of a systematic effect of the exchange rate regime on real GDP, unem-
ployment, housing prices, credit, and capital flows. Finally, Fig. 9
confirms that there is also apparently no link between the (now
finer) degree of financial openness and any variable responses, with
perhaps the exception of residents outflows, which tend to be more
negative for countries with higher capital mobility (a higher value of
the index).
Overall, these results confirm our previous findings that the degree
of capital mobility and the exchange rate regime do not seem to be key
drivers of most of the spillover effects of US monetary policy shocks.
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper we investigate the global effects of US monetary pol-
icy shocks using a two stage approach. First, we obtain estimates of US
monetary policy shocks by using an identification scheme based on
sign restrictions, consistent with the domestic effects of these shocks
in standard monetary models. This allows us to model the responses
of a range of interest rates and spreads to a US monetary policy
shock. Further, a number of macroeconomic and financial variables
at monthly and quarterly frequency are regressed on the estimated
shocks to compute impulse responses in 18 advanced and 18emerg-
ing economies. Countries are grouped on the basis of characteristics
like their income levels, the openness of their capital accounts, their
dollar exchange rate regime, dollar exposure in their foreign assets
and liabilities, trade openness vs. the US, and incidence of commod-
ity exports. All these variables are plausible candidates to explain the
cross country incidence of the effect of US monetary policy shocks.
We find that a surprise US monetary tightening leads to depre-
ciation vis-á-vis the US dollar in most countries in our sample;
industrial production and real GDP fall, and unemployment rises,
despite an improving trade balance. Inflation (GDP deflator and CPI)
also tends to fall in a majority of countries. Emerging economies
tend to experience more macroeconomic volatility. Responses of
financial variables are more heterogeneous and muted: bond yields
increase relative to the US yields in most countries, while real equity
and housing prices drop in about half the countries. Finally, we do
not find evidence of a systematic relation between country char-
acteristics and the distribution of cross-country responses to US
monetary policy shocks. While less flexibility in the dollar exchange
rate regime at least seems to limit the response of the nominal and
real exchange rate, which can be expected, asset prices and capital
flows do not react differently between more and less financially open
emerging economies.
A main policy implication of this finding is that, conditional on
monetarypolicyshocks,neithertheexchangerateregimenorfinancial
openness, at least the way we measure them, appear to matter much
for the international transmission of US monetary policy. In particular,
in line with Miniane and Rogers (2007), we do not find compelling
evidence that capital controls may provide an effective protection
against US monetary spillovers. Nevertheless, it should be kept in
mind that we do find evidence of significant country heterogeneity,
which suggests that spillovers are indeed asymmetric — though the
asymmetry is not well explained by the country characteristics we
have explored in the paper. Further research may focus on refining
the measurement of the country characteristics we have used, and
exploring whether other country characteristics matter to explain the
apparent heterogeneity in the effects.
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